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years,	 is	 especially	 symptomatic.	At	present,	 it	 is	 one	of	 the	
most	peaceful	republics	in	the	North	Caucasus.











tants	 to	 Syria,	 where	 hundreds-strong	 Caucasian	 (mainly	


























guarantees	 of	 high	 subsidies	 in	 exchange	 for	 stabilising	 the	








duced	 some	 repercussions.	 The	 short-term	 effects	 are	 a	 con-
sequence	 of	 the	 unprecedented	 repression	 used	 prior	 to	 the	
Sochi	Olympics,	while	the	long-term	effects	have	been	achieved	

































result	 in	unfreezing	the	conflicts	 in	 the	Caucasus,	 including	
a	reactivation	of	the	idea	of	Chechen	independence,	the	foun-
dations	for	which	are	being	laid	now	by	Kadyrov	(this	is	the	




































casian	 terrorist’	 or	 the	 ‘immigrant	depriving	Russians	of	work’	
–	now	the	enemy	is	the	‘Banderite’	and	the	‘American	imperialist’	
who	supports	him.	
Western	 journalists’	disinterest	 in	 the	North	Caucasus	can	also	
partly	be	viewed	as	a	‘Sochi	effect’.	Before	the	Olympics,	the	me-
dia	were	speculating	about	the	threat	the	proximity	of	the	war-






























etc.),	 which	 are	 nonetheless	 important	 destabilising	 factors3.	
Furthermore,	 the	 Caucasus	 is	 unstable	 because	 its	 economy	 is	
not	functioning.	This	region	is	less	an	integral	part	of	the	Russian	
Federation	but	 is	more	 like	a	Russian	colony,	where	the	relative	

















fortune-tellers	 and	 extorting	money	 from	 entrepreneurs).	 Fur-
thermore,	militants’	success	in	imposing	the	 ‘jihad	tax’	on	busi-
nessmen	has	encouraged	criminal	groups	and	representatives	of	
law	enforcement	 agencies	 to	 act	 in	a	 similar	way	 (forcing	 them	








































































Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 first	half	of		2014
Death	toll 749 750 700 529 181





killed	 in	 2010,	 yet	 only	 19	 in	 the	first	 half	 of	 2014.	 The	number	
of	militants	killed	has	 remained	at	more	or	 less	 the	 same	 level,	




Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 first	half	of		2014
Law	enforce-
ment	agencies
225 190 209 127 21
Militants 349 384 404 298 141
























have	 been	 commonplace	 there	 since	 the	 early	 1990s)	 were	 not	





Year 2010 2013 first	half	of	2014
Dagestan	 378 341 120
Chechnya 127 39 9
Ingushetia 134 36 12
Northern	Ossetia 24 3 0
Kabardino-Balkaria 79 92 25
Karachay-Cherkessia 2 5 0





























and	 jihad	being	fought	 in	different	parts	of	 the	globe	(above	all	
in	 the	Middle	East)6.	While	previously	 ‘Caucasianness’	was	 the	
most	important	notion	for	the	military	underground	in	the	Cau-







‘Caucasian	 Islamic	militants’.	 Thus	 in	 ideological	 terms	 (albeit	
not	 in	 operational	 ones),	 the	 Caucasus	 Emirate	 has	 undergone	
5	 For	more	 on	 the	 process	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	militants’	 ideology	 from	
Chechen	separatism	to	Caucasian	jihad	see:	Maciej	Falkowski,	 ‘Chechnya:	

























The	Caucasus	Emirate	 (in	 the	militants’	 terminology,	 Imarat 
Kavkaz)	was	proclaimed	in	2007	by	the	then	‘president’	of	the	
Chechen	 Republic	 of	 Ichkeria	 (ChRI),	 Dokka	 Umarov,	 later	








According	to	 the	militants’	propaganda,	 the	emirate	 is	an	 Is-
lamic	 state	 extending	 over	 the	 entire	North	Caucasus	 and	 it	






with	 its	 own	administration,	 courts,	 tax	 collection,	 etc.,	 it	 is	





ficult	 to	classify	 the	emirate	as	a	 terrorist	organisation	sensu 
stricto,	 since	 it	 is	 a	network.	The	 local	 armed	groups	 formed	
by	between	more	than	ten	and	several	dozen	militants,	oper-
ating	under	the	label	of	the	emirate	and	formally	recognising	























Paradoxically,	 the	 evolution	 of	Caucasus	Emirate’s	 ideology	 and	





















stan).	 The	most	widely	 publicised	 and	 the	most	 spectacular	 ac-
tions	held	by	Caucasian	militants	have	been	recently	seen	not	in	
Grozny	or	the	mountains	of	Dagestan,	but	near	Aleppo	and	Kob-



























by	 Chechen	 refugees	 living	 in	 Europe	 (according	 to	 various	
estimates,	between	150,000	and	250,000	Chechens	live	in	EU	


































small	 community	 in	 the	 jihad	probably	 stems	 from	changes	







•	 the	 groupings	which	 report	 to	 Islamic	 State	 (former	 ISIS)	








ers	( Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar);	at	present,	after	having	
teamed	up	with	the	mujahideen	from	other	countries,	it	is	
known	as	Jamaat Ahadun Ahad);























The	 ‘globalisation’	of	Caucasian	 jihad	has	alienated	 the	military	
underground	 from	 the	 local	 Caucasian	 communities.	 Although	
these	 communities	 identify	with	 the	Muslim	world,	 their	 local	
Caucasian	and	Chechen,	Ingush,	Avar,	etc.	identity	is	still	much	
more	 important	 to	 them.	 Even	 though	 Salafi	 ideas	 are	 gaining	











is	one	of	 the	key	elements	of	 the	Chechen	national	 identity	and	
where	 Islamisation	 of	 the	 socio-political	 life	 is	 not	 only	 rapidly	
developing	 but	 is	 also	 supported	 and	 sometimes	 even	 imposed	
by	 the	 government	 of	 the	 republic.	 Thus,	 the	 fundamentalists’	




not	 count	 on	 support	 from	 the	 general	 public,	 apart	 from	 their	







































salafism and sufism in the North Caucasus
salafism –	 an	 Islamic	 religious	movement	 of	 global	 nature.	









































‘traditional’	 Islam	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘non-traditional’	 Salafism.	
In	 the	 19th	 century,	Sufism	was	 the	driving	 force	 for	 Islamic	







ments,	which	were	 combating	 Salafis,	 gained	 power	 and	 in	
fact	took	control	of	official	 Islam	in	Dagestan,	Chechnya	and	
Ingushetia	 (the	 spiritual	 boards	 of	Muslims,	muftiyats).	 Be-
ing	 the	government’s	 close	 ally	 and	a	 serious	political	 force,	
Sufism	is	fiercely	combating	Salafis,	who	in	turn	see	Sufis	as	
heretics	who,	for	example,	through	their	cult	of	Sufi	leaders,	
















III. The CrIsIs IN CauCasus eMIraTe
The	problems	resulting	from	the	evolution	of	ideology	and	iden-
tity	seen	over	 the	past	 few	years	 in	 the	military	 Islamic	under-
ground	 in	 the	Caucasus	are	closely	 linked	 to	 the	organisational	




Dagestan.	 In	 Chechnya,	which	 until	 recently	was	 the	 centre	 of	
Caucasian	 jihad,	 guerrilla	 warfare	 brings	 to	 mind	 the	 activity	
of	 the	abreks, the	 legendary	 solitary	warriors,	who	were	hiding	
in	the	mountains	long	after	the	capitulation	of	Imam	Shamil	and	
the	end	of	the	19th-century	Caucasian	War.	In	the	other	republics,	
these	 guerillas	 are	 amateurs	 acting	 locally	 or	 desperados	 seek-
ing	personal	revenge,	whose	acts	are	often	difficult	to	distinguish	
from	criminal	activity7.
The	main	 reason	 behind	 the	 organisational	 crisis	 is	 the	 conse-





in	 the	Caucasus,	 building	 their	 strength	on	 the	 experience	 and	






among	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Islamic	 underground	 in	 the	 Caucasus	 today.	
Even	in	the	case	of	the	present	leader	of	the	emirate,	Ali	Abu	Muhammad	




















sors	who	were	decimated	 as	part	 of	 special	 operations	 (most	 of	
them	are	killed	on	the	spot	during	antiterrorist	operations).	
A	serious	blow	to	the	Caucasus	Emirate	was	the	death	of	Dokka	
Umarov,	 who	 had	 led	 the	 militants	 from	 2006	 and	 had	 taken	




well-known	 commander	 Aslambek	 Vadalov,	 and	 the	 militants	
from	 the	 other	 republics.	 Finally,	 Aliaskhab	Kebekov,	 native	 of	
Dagestan,	who	has	no	experience	 in	combat	and	 is	 lacking	cha-






































the	Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar organisation)	have	been	making	
efforts	to	salvage	his	position	by,	for	example,	publishing	record-
ings	 in	which	militants	 from	each	of	 the	 republics	 (vilayats, ac-
cording	to	the	militants’	terminology)	take	their	oath	to	the	emir	
for	 the	 second	 time.	 Furthermore,	 a	 statement	 from	 one	 of	 the	
most	 influential	 spiritual	 leaders	of	 jihad,	 the	 Jordanian	sheikh	






















IV. The effeCTs of CheCheNIsaTIoN  
aNd The ‘CarroT aNd sTICk’ TaCTIC
The	consequences	of	the	Russian	policy	towards	the	region,	above	
all	Chechnya,	constitute	an	equally	important	reason	for	the	par-
tial	 stabilisation	 in	 the	 Caucasus.	 The	 so-called	 Chechenisation	
policy	in	place	since	around	2002	has	called	for	replacing	the	pre-
vious	policy	of	occupation	of	Chechnya	(which	was	implemented	
by	 federal	 law	 enforcement	 agencies),	 relinquishing	 power	 in	
the	republic	to	the	loyal	Kadyrov	clan	(to	Akhmad	Kadyrov	until	
2004,	and	then	to	his	son,	Ramzan),	offering	the	republic	genuine	





















11	 For	more	on	 the	Chechenisation	policy	see:	Maciej	Falkowski,	 ‘Chechnya:	





























of	 ‘might	 is	 right’;	Russian	 legislation	 is	 in	use	only	 to	a	 limited	
extent),	 is	 forming	 in	 fact	 its	own	armed	forces	 (the	 formations	














dialogue	 in	Dagestan)	and	 the	militants	who	had	decided	 to	 lay	





























to	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Chechenisation	 policy,	 the	main	



































in	 the	 state	 administration;	 the	 Caucasus	was	 granted	 the	 sta-
tus	of	a	separate	federal	district	in	2010)	proves	that	the	federal	






The	Caucasus’s	stability	 is	closely	 linked	 to	 the	stability	of	Rus-
sia	 itself.	A	 serious	 economic	 and/or	 political	 crisis	 in	 the	Rus-
sian	 Federation,	 which	 cannot	 be	 ruled	 out	 in	 the	 immediate	
future,	 will	 be	 equivalent	 to	 an	 ‘unfreezing’	 of	 the	 Caucasian	
problems,	which	may	 explode	with	 new	 strength	 (as	 happened	
in	1917	or	1991).	Another	factor	which	adds	to	the	risk	of	a	serious	
13	 For	more	 see:	Maciej	 Falkowski,	 ‘The	 ‘Tribal	Areas’	 of	 the	Caucasus.	 The	
North	Caucasus	–	an	enclave	of	‘alien	civilisation’	within	the	Russian	Fed-

























the	Ukrainian	 crisis.	 These	 concerns	 are	 not	 groundless,	 given	
the	fact	that	the	Accounts	Chamber	of	the	Russian	Federation	has	
confirmed	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 decrease	 the	 subsidies	 for	 the	
North	Caucasus14.
The	 ‘unfreezing’	 of	 the	 Caucasian	 problems,	 especially	 if	 this	
comes	from	the	Kremlin	loosening	its	grip	on	the	region	as	a	con-
sequence	of	an	internal	crisis,	may	lead	above	all	 to	a	rejuvena-
tion	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 Chechen	 independence.	 Ramzan	 Kadyrov	 is	
laying	the	foundations	for	this	idea	much	more	successfully	than	
General	Dzhokhar	Dudayev	did	in	the	early	1990s.	The	Caucasus	









































































































































































The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) is an independent, public 
research organisation dedicated to the monitoring of events and 
analysing the socio-political and economic processes taking place 
in Russia, Germany, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, the Viseg-
rad Group states, the Balkans and Turkey.
OSW conducts regional research studies on security, energy, mi-
gration and the integration processes in Central Europe, the Bal-
kans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Nordic-Baltic and Black 
Sea regions.
The resort was founded in 1990 as a state-funded unit of public ad-
ministration. It has had its current form as a legal entity of the state 
since 2012, under the appropriate parliamentary act of july 2011.
OSW’s main task is to prepare analyses, expertise and prognostic 
studies for the public authorities of the Republic of Poland about 
important events and political, social and economic processes in 
Poland’s international environment.
The main activities of  OSW are fully financed from the state budget.
Every year we publish hundreds of studies in Polish and English 
in the form of a weekly newsletter, and a series of Commentar-
ies available for free subscription. OSW’s publications also include 
cross-section studies on major political, social and economic pro-
cesses in OSW’s area of interest (the OSW Studies); studies on 
selected sectoral issues (the OSW Reports), as well as individual 
papers presenting the opinions of our experts on current topics 
(Points of View).
Our publications are available at osw.waw.pl 
and on the OSW’s pages on Facebook and Twitter
